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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the
Adoption of:
JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT,

Case No. 15272

A Minor.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, John Wayne Cox, claims that in the May 6,
1977 and June 1, 1977, orders and decree in this adoption
proceeding of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
Judge presiding incorrectly applied the laws of Utah in
terminating all appellant's parental rights to his son Jason
Michael Wright.
DISPOSITION IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
On December 7, 1976, Jason Michael Wright's natural
mother Sherrie Lynn Wright Marsden and her husband Dee C.
Marsden petitioned the Third District Court that Mr. Marsden
be allowed to adopt the minor child Jason Michael Wright
(Record before the Utah Supreme Court pages 2 and 3, hereafter
references to the Record before the Utah Supreme Court will
be cited as "R." with ''p." standing for page or pages).
John \Jayne Cox filed an answer and

affidavit in opposition
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to said petition (R.p. 5-ll).

Because John Wayne Cox did

not appear at the February 10, 1977, hearing the petition
was granted as prayed by Judge Banks

(R.p. 12-18).

Subse-

quently, John W. Cox moved that the Decree of Adoption be
set aside

(R. p. 19).

On March 25, 1977, pursuant to further

hearing before Judge Banks the February 10, 1977, Decree of
Adoption was set aside (R.p. 24-25).

Judge Banks then ruled

that John Wayne Cox had no parental rights to his son or
that he had abandoned his son and therefore again granted
the adoption as prayed (R.p.

36-42).
FACTS

Between November 1971 and August 1972, John Wayne Cox
and the then Sherrie Lynn Wright maintained an amorous
relatlor

c~,r

Transcript, page 4 line 25 to page 5 line l;

hereinafter references to the transcript will be cited "T."
with "p." denoting the page or pages, and "1." the line or
lines).

Prior to August 1972 when Miss Wright learned she

was pregnant they planned to marry but she changed her mind
(T.p.S,l. 2-7).

After learning that a criminal charge

alleging bastardy and carnal knowledge had been filed against
him, John Wayne Cox went to the State of Oregon (T.p. 5,
l. 8-24).

On October 13, 1972, Mr. Cox was arrested

(T.p.6,

l. 14-18) and jailed for one week (T.p. 7,1. 22-23, T. p.
38,1. 16-18) in Oregon on a fugitive complaint from the
State of Utah on the bastardy and carnal knowledge charges
filed by Miss lvright 's mother
55,1. 27 thru p. 56,1.4).

(T .p. 74, 1. 28-30 ar,d T. p.

The crim1nal charges were dismissE
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit lP,T.p. 7, 1. 25-28) on the condition
Mr. Cox stay away from Miss Wright (T.p. 75, 1. 1-30,
T.p. 76, l. 1-13 and T. p. 73, 1. 12-21).

While in Oregon,

Mr. Cox was afraid to contact Miss Wright because a Dectective
informed him that the criminal actions against him would be
reinstated if he contacted her (T.p. 20,1. 24 through T. p.
21, 1. 8).

On January 3, 1973, Mr. Cox enlisted in the

United States Marine Corps

(T.p. 21, 1. 21-22).

Mr. Cox

wrote to Miss Wright's Bishop, Smoke Hills, requesting that
Miss Wright and the unborn child be given a blessing
(T.p. 21, 1. 26-30 and T.p. 22, 1. 1, 8-13).

The parties'

child was born March 11, 1973 (T.p. 13, 1. 17-21; that Mr.
Cox is the father see T.p. 17, 1. 24-25, and T.p. 47, 1.
9-15).

On or about April 1, 1973, Mr. Cox returned to Utah

and was anxious to learn of his newborn child (T.p. 22,
1. 14-25).

Since he was afraid of being arrested he did not

contacc Miss Wright directly (T.p. 22, 1. 25-29) but got the
desired information from the Bishop (T. p. 22, 1. 30, T.p.
23, 1. l-10).

On or about July l, 1973, Mr. Cox was again

in Utah and visited his four
l.

(4) month old son (T.p. 25,

14-30; T. p. 51, l . 3-7; and T.p.

76, 1. 18-19).

mid July, 1973, Mr. Cox was sent to Japan
28-30 and T. p. 28, 1. 1-6).
Miss Wright

In

(T.p. 27, 1.

While in Japan, Mr. Cox telephoned

(T.p. 28, 1. 14-15; T.p. 48, 1. 4-6).

While in

Japan, Mr. cox aranged for Miss Wright to receive an alotment
for Jason (the parties' child) which she asked to be terminated
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(Exhibit 2 p; and T. p. 28, l . 23-30; T.p.
p. 30, 1. 6)

29, l . 30 through

In April, 1974, Mr. Cox returned to the United

States and telephoned Miss Wright from California
l.

8-18).

(T.p. 30,

In the California telephone conversation Miss

Wright informed him that if he bothered her when he got back
she would call the police (T.p. 51, l. 23-30).
Since April 1974 Mr. Cox has been keeping track of his
son Jason through Miss Wright's brother and sister-in-law
Mr. Mike and Mrs. Kathy Wright
l.

(T.p. 32, 1. 9-20, T.p. 60,

10-14; T.p. 60, l . 20-21; T.p. 61, l . 7-10; T.p. 62,

l. 3-9; T. p. 70, 1. 18-25, T.p. 71, 1. 1-5; T.p. 71, l.
16-18).

Through these contacts Mr. Cox learned that Jason

was in the Cottonwood Hospital.

He went to see his son but

abort"'d '-l1e errand after entering the hospital because he
was afraid of being arrested if Miss Wright was there and
she construed the visit bothersome (T.p. 31, 1. ll top. 32,
l.

2).

In August 26, 1975, Mr. Cox was seriously injured in a
motorcycle collision and was ordered by his physician not to
work until March 25, 1977.

In May 1976 Mr. Cox sought legal

assistance in obtaining visitation with his son (T.p. 32,
l. 28 through p. 33, 1. 6) but because of his poverty could
not retain an attorney (T.p.

33, l. 15-22).

In June 7, 1976, Mr. Cox acknowledged his paternity of
Jason on a Utah Division of Health form (Exhibit 3 P).
Besides the above, Mr. Cox claims:
inquired of Miss Wright on seucral

(l) by telephone he

o~cassions

about Jason
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(T.p. 18, l. 6-12, T. p. 23, l. ll-25, T.p. 24, l. 2-16,
T.p. 30, l . 21-30 through p. 31, l . 10).

(2) by letter he

inquired of Jason (T.p. 24, l . 5-16, p. 28, l. 7-22).

(3)

offered financial assistance (T.p. 24, 1. 30 to p. 25,
l.

12; p. 26, l. l-7) and (4)•he gave her at least $200.00

(T.p. 32, l. 3-8).

On the other hand Miss Wright does not

remember any inquiry about Jason (T.p. 51, 1. 8-22) though
she admits Mr. Cox was very attentive to her while he was
out of Utah (T.p. 42, 1. 15-16).

Furthermore, Miss Wright

remembers she was afraid of Mr. Cox (T.p. 53, 1. 1-30),
wanted him to stay away from her and Jason (T.p. 55, 1.
4-8)

She intended to call the police if he carne around

(T.p. 55, 1. 9-11, 24-26), and she never encouraged a
relationship between Jason and his father

(T.p. 57, 1.

9-12).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The District Court erred in its finding "that it was
almost a statutory rape and it is the Courts (sic) opinion
that he never acquired any rights by being the father,
either by statute and or by common law ... (R.p.36) ."
A.

The United States' Constitution protects the unwed

father's rights to his child.
The lead case is Stanley v. Illinois,405 US 645, 31 L
Ed 2d 551, 92 S Ct 1208 (1972).

In Stanley upon the death

of the natural mother an Illinois Court ordered the children
into foster homes because the biological parents had not
lJ<'CJl

married, so the natural father had no rights to the
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children.

The United States Supreme Court reversed and

specifically held that the unwed father must be granted the
same opportunity to custody of his children as a wed father
because of the due process clause and equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
B.

Stan~

is still the law of the land.

The laws of the State of Utah protect the unwed

father's rights to his child.
Until 1966 it was clear that under the provisions of
78-30-4, U.C.A.

(1953), an illegitimate child could be

adopted upon the consent of only the mother.

The putative

natural father had no standing in regard to such child
Thomas v. Chlldren's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 U.2d 235,
239; 364 p. 2d 1029 (1961).

§78-30-4, U.C.A.

(1953)

then

provided:
A legitimate child cannot be adopted without
consent of its parents, if living, nor an
illegitimate child without consent of its
mother, if living ...
However, this provision was amended in 1966 to provide:
A child cannot be adopted without consent of each
living parent, having rights in relation to said
child ...
Subsequent to said amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized rights in a natural father.
of M, 25 U.2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013,

In State In Interest

(1970), the Utah Supreme

Court addressed for the first time the issue of

~hether

father of an illegitimate child, where he has publicly
acknowledged it, has a legal right to care, custody, and
-6-
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the

control of his child.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

... since the father of the illegitimate
child has been given the statutory duty
to support and educate the child, independent of the bastardy proceedings, he
should have the corresponding right to
the custody of the child in the proper
case ... Since the father's duty to support
and educate the child is the same extent
as if the child was born in lawful wedlock,
it should follow that the father's right
to custody should be almost as co-extensive.
Id. at 1016.
The court followed Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d
202, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1957) saying:
the court stated that it was a fundamental
principle that no court can, for any but
the gravest reasons, transfer a child from
its natural parent to any other person,
since the right of a parent, under natural
law, to establish a home and bring up
children is a fundamental one and beyond
the reach of any court.
This rule applies
to illegitimate as well as legitimate
children.
Id. at 1017, emphasis added.
The Utah Supreme Court then explained that:
The common law doctrine of filius nullius has
been superceded by legislative action. A
statutory parent-child relationship has been
established between the publicly acknowledged
child and his putative father that places the
child in parity with a legitimate child in
rights of support, education, and inheritance.
Id. at 1017.
The trend is to eliminate all distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children.

The Utah Legislature

continues to reflect the modern trend when in 1975, it again
amended §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, by adding to it
suL>sections 3 (a) (b) (c) and (d).

Those new sections clearly

spell out the manner in which a father of an illegitimate
ch1ld may claim his rights.

There, the legislature requires
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that the natural father file an acknowledgement of paternity
with the Bureau of Vital

Stati~tics.

Once that

acknowledge~

has been filed, an adoption may not be granted without conser
of the natural father, or a showing of his abandonment of
the child.

It

Legi~lature

wants to protect the rights of natural fathers

i~

clear from those amendments that the Utah

and lays out clear guidelines as to the manner in which
those

right~

are to be safeguarded.

John Cox has followed the statutory scheme to acknowledc
his son by filing the requisite notice with the Utah Bureau
of Vital Statistics.

His paternity is not contested and he

has stated, under oath, in open court, that he is ready and
willing to

as~ume

all duties and obligations that are contiru

on his parenthood.

Mr. Cox has not been convicted of any

criminal act relating to the circumstances of his son's
birth or his prior relationship with Mrs. Marsden.

The

court cannot properly view him as anyone but a natural
father attempting to assert rights in his natural son.

If

the bastardy charges against Mr. Cox had been successfully
pursued under Utah law Mr. cox would have certain rights to
his child.

(77-60-12, U.C.A. as amended).
POINT II

The District Court erred in its finding,

"that he

abandoned the child and forfeited any rights that he may
have had (R.p.36) ."
The legal

~tandard

to be follov1ed in this

lil~>.'sui

t is

set out in §78-30-5, U.C.A.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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78-30-5. Adoption of deserted child.--A child deserted
by its parent or parents, and having no legal guardian,
may be adopted as in this chapter provided, without
the consent of the parent or parents having deserted
said child, when the district court in which the
proceedings are pending shall determine that such child
has been deserted by its parent or parents.
Realizing that desertion is difficult to prove the Utah
Legislature relaxed the standard by amending the above
statute effective May 10, 1977.
The seminal case interpreting what desertion or abandonment
means under the pre May 10, 1977, statute, which is the law
in this lawsuit, is In re Adoption of Walton, 123
259 P.2d 881 (1953).

u.

380,

There the court stated:

Courts have not hesitated to build a strong fortress
around the parent child relation, and have stocked
it with ammunition in the form of established rules
that add to its inpregnability. To sever the relationship successfully, one must have abandoned the child,
and such abandonment must be with a specific intent so
to do - an intent to sever all correlative rights and
duties incident to the relationship.
Such intent must
be proved by him who asserts it, by proof that not only
preponderates, but which must be clear and satisfactory,
something akin to that degree of proof necessary to
establish an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or,
as one authority puts it "by clear and indubitable
evidence." Id. at 883.
Perhaps this Court has traveled as far as any in
giving expression to the type of abandonment intended
to exist in order to sever parental ties when we said
in a custody case, that 'abandonment, in such cases,
ordinarily means that the parent has placed the child
on some doorstep or left it in some convenient place
in the hope that someone will find it and take charge
of it, or had abandoned it entirely to the chance or
fate." [citing Jensen v. Earley, 63 u. 604, 612, 228
P. 217, 220 (1924).] Id. at 883, 884
In Walton, the court reversed a Decree of Adoption holding
that the evidence of separation and non-support did not
sustain the finding of abandonment by the natural father.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Id. at 382-385

259 P.2d at 883-884.

This position has been

reaffirmed by the Utah Court when no desertion was found
In re Adoption of Jameson, 20 Utah 2d 53, 432 P.2d 881
( 196 7)

even though the natural mother was away from her

child because of reoccurring imprisonment for criminal
activity.
In the case at hand, there is nothing in the record
that evidences a clear, specific, intentional severing of
parental rights and duties by Mr. Cox when he was threatened
with incarceration if he tried to contact his child.
Clearly the very high burden of proof that Utah courts
require for a finding of abandonment has not been met.
The Supreme Court of Utah most recently reaffirmed
Walton,

~upra,

on February 9, 1977, in the case of Robertson

v. Hutchlson 560 P.2d

1110 (1977).

There the court cites

In re Adoption of Walton, supra, and goes on to state:
Accordingly the court does not easily find such
abandonment, but will do so only when the
evidence is clear and convincing that the
parent has either expressed an intention, or
so conducted himself as to clearly indicate an
intention, to relinquish parental rights and
reject parental responsibilities to his child.
Id. at 1112.
The facts of Robertson v. Hutchison show that the Robertsons
had filed a Petition to adopt two children of Mr. Robertson
by his former marriage to Judith Ann Hutchison.
wife filed objections to said adoption.

The former

Mrs. Hutchison

had

practically no contact with her children from September of
1970 until the summer of 1975.

The Utah Supreme Court took
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into consideration the fact that Mrs. Hutchison was without
financial means to visit or to attempt to obtain custody of
her children untl 1975.

The Court pointed out that she was

involved in a serious automobile accident in 1971 for which
she was hospitalized and received extensive and expensive
medical treatment.

While not excusing Mrs. Hutchison's

conduct, the Court found that she had not abandoned her
children.
The child, Jason, was born March 11, 1973.
visited his child on or about April 1, 1973.

Mr. Cox

Mr.

Cox was required to be away from his child because of military
service between January 3, 1973 and April, 1974.

During his

military service Mr. Cox offered financial assistance which
was accepted for a period of time but later refused.

Since

April, 1974, Mr. Cox has followed his son's progress through
relatives.

He has acknowledged his son by filing a notice

with the Bureau of Vital Statistics as required by statute
before the Petition for Adoption was filed herein.
John Cox was involved in a very serious motorcycle
accident in 1975.

But for the physical and financial strain

caused by that accident,

Mr Cox would have taken affirmative

actions to secure visitation rights with his son through the
Courts.

Mr. Cox has been precluded from establishing any

sort of a relationship with his son because of the threat of
criminal action against him by his child's mother and her
parents.
There is no "conscious disregard of the obligaions owed
-11-
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by a parent to a child State In Ir.tccrcst of Su_mmcrs
Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 at 334

(1977)"

in this lawsuit but a father who has been threatened with
incarceration if he fulfilled his obligations.
CONCLUSION
The Third District Court erred in its order terminating
John Cox's parental rights to his son Jason.

Therefore, the

Utah Supreme Cour~hould ~:: order.

~

DATED this £day of

, 1977.
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I, the ur.dersigned, hereby certify that I served the
foregoing Brief by placing two true and correct copies of
said Brief in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to:

Lambertus Jansen and Douglas P. DeJulio,

Attorneys for Respondent, MFT Plaza, Suite s-1, 105 East
5900 South, Murray, Utah 84107, this

{~rl~ay

of

f(lftf[u),

1977.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

